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AN INFORlJIATION EXPLANATION OF TIlE SURVIVAL OF
TECllNICAL ANALYSIS IN CAPITAL MARKET

Abstract
In an efficient market, technical analysis cannot earn abnormal returns.
Technical strategies are inferior to a buy and hold strategy since they
typically churn investor accounts. Nonetheless, technical analysis appears to
thrive. The purpose of this paper is to explain why technical analysis survives
even though it is inferior to a buy-and-hold strategy. A model is developed
that compares four investor groups -- informed insiders, buy-and-hold investors,
technical traders, and uninformed naive fundamental traders -- and are compared
in the model. Surprisin~ly, it demonstrates the superiority of technical
analysis relative to fundamental analysis. The equilibrium requires that
different classes of investors earn different rates of return. Informed traders
can only earn sufficient returns to cover their costs if there exist traders
\.;ho, in some sense, are tradin~ on bad information or "noise" in the Fisher
Black sense. The ultimate explanation for the survival of naive investment
strategies is that informed traders must have someone with whom to trade. If
all uninformed traders are driven out of the market there is no benefit to being
informed.

I.

Introduction
Technical analysis is a dominated strategy compared to a buy-and-hold

strategy.

According to efficient market hypothesis, technical analysis makes

money only for brokers or newsletter publishers.
the

vie,~

Empirical evidence supports

that investors can not earn abnormal profits using securities price and

volume information.

Nonetheless, technical analysis survives.

The objective of this paper is to explain lihy technical analysis survives,
even though it is inferior to a buy-and-hold strategy.

This paper is concerned

with naive technical analyses such as the Dow theory, bar charts and point and
figure charts.
There are few sophisticated technical rules that may explain why technical
analysis I.orks.

For example, Treynor and Ferguson (JF, 2985) demonstrate the

usefulness of past price information in making an abnormal profit.

They develop

a Bayesian probability estimate using past price data to assess whether the
market incorporates some firm-specific information, that is made available to
investors.
I~ith

If the market does not have such information, and this is confirmed

past price data, the investor with this private information can make a

trading profit.

Technical analysis in the Treynor-Ferguson sense is beyond the

scope of this paper, however.

This paper only explains the apparent paradox,

that is, technical analysis does not work in an efficient capital market, yet it
survives.
II.

Alternative Explanations
(a) The technical traders earn a risk-adjusted rate of return for accounts,

but they could expect to earn the same return selecting securities randomly.
Technical analysis is not Iwrthlihile to perform in an efficient capital market;
technical analysis lVill lose money over time by churning accounts.

One possible
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explanation why technical analysis survives
replaced by other naive investors.

IS

that losers quit, but they are

The ne\; naive investors entering the market,

who play this technical analysis game, do not know anything about the naive
investors exiting the market.

It is sufficient for technical analysis to

survive if the number of new naive investors equals the number of losers who
exit the market.
(b) Technical analysis may be superior to naive fundamental analysis if
naive investors buy and sell securities on the basis of published public
information (for example, accounting reports, earnings multipliers, etc.).
These naive investors are likely to lose against well-informed insiders (and
other experts) who obtain information more quickly or interpret such information
more rapidly.

The naive investors will be the last to buy when informed

investors are selling and to sell when informed investors are buying.

In this

scenario, a wealth transfer from naive investors to informed investors occurs.
Informed investors cannot profit from investors who employ a buy-and-hold
strategy.

They can only profit over naive investors who trade on inferior

information.
(c) Trading based on technical analysis is the same as trading based on a
random strategy.

Security prices change randomly.

Any trading rule based on

random changes is random, unless many technical traders follow the same rule.
Technical traders follow numerous techniques.

Therefore, it is reasonable to

assume that buy and sell orders occur randomly and approximate white noises.
Random trading averages out the time one buys with the informed insiders \;ith
the time one sells when the informed traders buy.

Naive fundamental traders

consistently lose money because they tend to buy and sell at the wrong time.

A
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random strategy based on technical analysis is, therefore, superior to a naive
fundamental analysis.
The rates of returns earned by different investor groups can be ranked as:
(1) Informed insiders; (2) Buy-and-hold investors; (3) Technical traders; (4)
Naive fundamental investors.

Buy-and-hold investors earn a risk-adjusted rate

of return warranted by an efficient capital market.

The informed investors earn

a rate of return above risk-adjusted rate of return while the naive fundamental
investors earn a rate of return below risk-adjusted rate of return.

Since the

uninformed naive investors are consistently wrong, they earn a lower rate of
return than that of technical traders who trade randomly.

For an example,

assume that the risk-adjusted rate of return is 87. if everyone is an informed
insider.

The informed insider is able to earn a 107. risk-adjusted rate of

return if the uninformed naive investor trades at the wrong time.

The

difference, 2%, is a pure I'ealth transfer from uninformed naive investors to
informed insiders . .The informed insiders can gain a higher return only at the
expense of uninformed investors; they cannot gain from buy-and-hold investors.
(d) Technical analysis provides liquidity service to the stock market.
Otherwise, all trading activities would be among informed traders.

Informed

traders would eaarn only a risk-adjusted rate of return which would not be
sufficient to pay the informed traders to collect information.

In this

scenario, the informed traders would stop trading and the stock market would
lose liquidity.
market.

Technical analysts induce naive investors to enter the stock

The informed traders then trade with poorly informed naive fundamental

traders.
In addition, technical analysis provides service to traders engaged in
t~ansactions

or portfolio revision.

1 portfolio revision trade occurs when an
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investor sells securities to raise cash for a loan payment due immediately, for
example, or a sudden death requires a portfolio rebalancing between cash and
securities.

This kind of trade is strictly transaction-specific.

traders do not trade on information at all.

Technical

However, this kind of

transaction-specific trade may not provide enough liquidity to the stock market
and may not make information gathering a worthwhile activity.
fundamentalists add to stock market liquidity.

The naive

Technical analysis is

essentially a random strategy that provides a liquidity service to the stock
market while earning a normal rate of return for such service.
III.
A.

Model
Assumptions
(1)

Investors are risk-neutral expected end-of-period wealth maximizers.

(2)

Investors have limited wealth, and they cannot borrow.

(3)

Risk-free security is used as a numeraire.

(4)

One period. model is considered.

The sequence of events in the model can be represented by the following diagram:
Po
,

,

PT
,

Pi

tT

t1

I

,-------------- ,--------------- ,--------------- ,----
to
Endowment

tI
Information

Trading

Payoff

Let a trader start with N risky stocks whose price is denoted by a risk-free
numeraire good F.

The trader receives information at current time and either

makes a trade or does not make a trade.
of the current period.

The expected payoff occurs at the end

B.

Notations
Po

= current price of security at time to'

tI

= time information is received.

PT = trading price of stock at time t T.
Pi = end-of-period price of stock at time t i .
N = number of stocks.

F

= unit of risk-free security.

Rf = risk-free rate.
PF = expected price by a naive fundamentalist.

PF = current price of a naive fundamentalist.
PI = current price of an informed trader.
C(I)= cost of information.
C.

Basic Model

(1)

The basic model can be represented by two simple equations:
E(P i )
Buy- and- hold trade.
Po = l+R
f

E[P 1
(2)

PT =

, ¢]
I

Information trade.

l+Rf

The profit from trade can be written as:
E(P i )
(3)
Buy-and-hold trade.
NPV = N [ 1+R
- PO]
f

(4)

NPV

=N [

Information trade.

If trading In stocks is a fair game, tomorro"'s price is expected to be the same
as todayi s price; expected profit is zero.
efficient capital marKet hypothesis.

This scenario conforms to the
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The model purports to show that the informed insider with super_or
information earns profit at the expense of naive fundamentalists \{ith inferior
informatioin.

The buy-and-hold investors earn a risk-adjusted rate of return.

The technical analysts follow a coin-flipping random strategy and earn a rate of
return better than the naive fundamentalists.

Within the context of the basic

model, we will state and prove a number of hypotheses.
D.

Hypotheses
(1) The value of information is zero if all traders have equal access to

information or uninformed traders employ a buy-and-hold strategy.
Proof
We will prove this hypothesis under three assumptions regarding the cost of
information.
1a.

Information is cost less and each trader has equal access to

information.
The end-of-period wealth of a trader can be written as
(5)

if it is an information trade.

(6)

if it is a buy-and-hold trade.

Informed insiders have conclusive information about the end-oi-period price P1 "
If all traders are informed, the profit from information trade is zero because
P1
P1
P1
(7)

NPV

= - PT + l+R = - l+R + l+R = 0

f
f
f
Therefore, there is no gain from information trades and there is no incentive to
collect information.

If some traders are informed and some

~re

uninformed:

however, the informed traders cease to trade with each other and the uninformed
traders simply follow a buy-and-hold strategy.

This is paradoxical; no trade

\{ill occur because it does not pay to be informed.

lb.

Information is costly, and each trader has equal access to

information.
The profit from a trade is
NPV

(8)

=

¢]

E[P 1

- PT - C(I)

Because information collection is a negative NPV undertaking, no trader collects
information.

If information is collected, however, profit can be earned.

result is also puzzling.

This

The uninformed trader simply follows a buy-and-hold

strategy as no profit can be earned by an information trade.
1c.

Information costs are different for various groups of traders, and

each trader has equal access to information.
If the cost of information is greater for uninformed traders, the
uninformed traders simply buy-and-hold -- no trade occurs.

Given rational

expectations, the uninformed traders know ex-ante that they will lose in trade
with informed insiders.

Hence, they will cease to trade.

As a result,

obtaining costly information is a losing strategy for the informed insiders.
Therefore, no trader gets information.
These three results based upon costless, identically costly, and
differentially costly

i~formation

are not in equilibrium.

These paradoxes

resemble the well-known Grossman-Stiglitz paradox about security prices in an
efficient capital market.
(2)

A random technical strategy dominates a naive fundamentalist strategy.

A random strategy is similar to flipping a fair COIn.

The technician makes

a buy trade if a head appears and makes a sell trade if a.tail appears.
he loses half of the time and wins half of the time.
he earns zero excess returns whether he trades

I~ith

Hence,

Over a sequence of trade,
an insider or a naive
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fundamentalist.

A naive fundamentalist does not know P and acts on the basis of

his poor information believing that it is good information whereas, in fact, it
is poor information.

The insider knows the true end-of-period price Pl.

A naive trader buys if
(9)

PF

PF < l+R

f

and sells if

(10)

PF

PF > l+R

f
And insider buys if

(11)

P1

PI < l+R

f

and sells if

(12)

P1

PI > l+R

f
PF is a noisy signal. of actual price P1 , i.e., PF = (P 1 + E) because a naive
trader buys if PF > PI and sells if PF < PI· Because PI is the discounted price
of the actual end-of-period price P1 , a naive trader loses money on either buy
or sell trade consistently. Consequently, he earns a rate of return less than
risk-free rate in a sequence of trade as he buys and sells at the wrong time.
Therefore, a technical analyst earns a superior return to a naive
fundamentalist.

SELECTED

nInLIOG~\PllY

XLI, No.3, July,

1.

Black, Fisher, "Noise," The Journal of Finance, Vol.
1986.

2.

Fer&uson, Robert, "Active Portfolio Management - How to Beat the Index
Funds," Financial Analvsts Journal 31 (May/June 1979), pp. 63-72.

3.

Grossman, Sanford and Stiglitz, Joseph E., "Information and Competitive
Price Systems," American Economic RevieH, ~Iay 1976,66(2), pp. 246-53.

4.

-r------:--, "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
American Economic RevieH, June 1980, 70(3), pp. 393-408.

5.

~Iurphy,

6.

~Iarkets, II

J. Austin, "Futures Fund Performance: A Test of the Effectiveness
of Technical Analysis," Journal of Futures Markets, Summer 1986, pp.
175- 85.
Neftci, Salih N. and Policano, AndreH J., "Can Chartists Outperform the
Market Efficiency Tests for Technical Analysis," Journal of
Futures Markets, Winter 1984, pp. 465-78.

~Iarket?

7.

Pinches, GeorO"e E., "The Random Walk Hypothesis and Technical Analysis,"
Financial Anafvsts Journal, March-April, 1970.

8.

Sharpe, William F., "JIutual Fund Performance," Journal of Bllsiness, January
1966.

9.

Sorensen, Eric H., "In Defense of Technical Analysis:
Journal of Finance, Vol.- XL, No.3, July 1985.

10.

Tomek, William G. and Querin, Scott F., "Random Processes in Prices and
Technical Analysis," Journal of Futures Markets, Spring 1984, pp. 15-23.

11.

Treynor, Jack L. and Ferguson, Robert, "In Defense of Technical Analysis,"
The Journal of Finance, Vol. XL, No.3, July 1985.

12.

Treynor, Jack L. and Black, Fisher, "HOI-r to Use Security Analysis to
Improve Portfolio Selection," Journal of Business 46 (January 1973), pp.
66- 86.

Discussion," The

